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
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


LEVEL^{II}

**A TRIDENT SCHOLAR
PROJECT REPORT**

NO. 103

**UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY
IN EAST ASIA: THE JAPANESE FACTOR**



**UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
1979**

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UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY
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
A Trident Scholar Project Report

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ABSTRACT

United States security policy in East Asia is still in large measure based on President Ford's "New Pacific Doctrine" of 7 December 1975. The first point made by this doctrine is that American strength is based to any stable balance of power in the Pacific. Significantly, the doctrine's second point emphasizes the importance of relations with Japan in maintaining peace and stability in the area. Recent elaborations on this policy have included Secretary of State Vance's speech before the Asia Society in June, 1977, Vice-President Mondale's trip to Japan in February 1977, and Secretary of Defense Brown's address in Los Angeles on 20 February 1978. All of these statements are consistent with Ford's New Pacific Doctrine regarding the relationship with Japan.

The main point of this paper is to show how United States security policy in East Asia is affected by Japan. The first step is to define United States security objectives in East Asia and the security-related aspects of Japanese-American relations. The Japanese view of security described in Chapters Three and Four will, hopefully, provide a different perspective on East Asian security. After looking at both the United States' and Japan's individual views of security, the author brings the two together. Several options for United States security policy, while remembering Japanese attitudes, positions, and restrictions, are presented. Finally, greater cooperation and coordination between Japan and the United States in security matters is proposed and supported.

PREFACE

This paper was originally to have been the "...Chinese and Japanese Factors." My thanks go to the Trident Committee for encouraging me to halve those great expectations. Thanks are also due Captain James Baker, USN and Commander Nepier Smith, USN for their advice and assistance, especially in the early stages. Hopefully, this paper will provide some food for thought in their continually busy day.

Most importantly, I would like to express my appreciation to my adviser of the last three years, Dr. Robert L. Rau. His guidance throughout the project, from conception to final draft, has been fantastic. We had no formal schedule of meetings, but kept in touch approximately once a week. This lack of rigid deadlines was one of the greatest experiences of the Trident program. By leaving the scheduling up to me, I feel I learned more than just the subject material. There was also a feeling of responsibility and the desire to do a good job.

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CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN EAST ASIA

Different authorities use different terminology and orders of importance. But, the spirit of U.S. security objectives in East Asia can be defined as follows: 1) Maintain Japan as a U.S. and Western ally; 2) Deter aggression through the maintenance of forward bases; 3) Limit nuclear proliferation; 4) Promotion of and assistance to friendly nations; and 5) Moderate Soviet expansion. Security objectives are attained through military, political and economic methods.¹

CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF JAPAN AS A UNITED STATES AND WESTERN ALLY

Why should the United States care about Japan, a nation we defeated in World War II thirty-five years ago? Japan has traditionally been a victim of racial prejudice in the United States. More often than not the Japanese were characterized as a nation of copiers using western technology, unskilled labor to make cheaper versions of western products. The wide cultural gap only intensified these feelings of prejudice. How then, has Japan become "A key to stability in the Asia-Pacific region..."?²

Through an "economic miracle" and much hard work Japan has built the world's third largest economy since the devastation of World War II. Today, Japan is our largest trading partner in Asia. Japan is the largest trading partner of every East Asian nation.³ Also, Japan has become the world's ninth largest military power in terms of absolute defense expenditures.⁴ "Keeping Japan a stable and economic part of the coalition that so much sustains what order and progress the world now offers is a very high priority in U.S. policy."⁵

Table 1

**UNITED STATES-SOVIET-CHINESE
MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST**

	<u>People's Republic of China</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>	<u>United States</u>
Troops	3,000,000	over 300,000	approx. 50,000
Aircraft	5,000	2,000	approx. 450
Naval Tonnage	410,000 tons	1,250,000 tons	600,000 tons

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977, p. 22.

How is the United States prepared to back this policy militarily? Since 1951 the U.S. and Japan have had a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Several Ships of the Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft carrier USS MIDWAY, are homeported in Japan. Okinawa, once again a part of Japan, is the base for two-thirds of a Marine division. When the scheduled, if prolonged, withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division from Korea is completed in the nineteen eighties, those Marines will be our only ground forces west of Hawaii. Japan, along with our Philippine bases, are the major basing and staging areas for any U.S. operations in East Asia. (See Appendix 1)

Without Japan and the current U.S. bases located there our military posture in terms of troop units, squadrons and ships would have to be reduced to less than half its present level. It is doubtful that the government of the Philippines would allow the permanent stationing of Marine units. The nearest base for troops, outside the politically difficult Korean Peninsula, is the crowded and isolated Mariana Islands. Without the homeporting and repair facilities available in Yokosuka and Sasebo the Seventh Fleet would not be able to maintain its present size or state of readiness for any period of time. The support facilities for the Air Force are not as crucial in case of limited operations. But in the case of sustained operations the Japanese facilities are indispensable. Without Japan as an ally, the whole idea of deterrence and quick response through forward basing is jeopardized.

DETERRENCE OF AGGRESSION THROUGH MAINTENANCE OF FORWARD BASES

"The principal military task of the United States in the Asia-

Pacific area continues to be the deterrence of aggression or violence that would threaten its interests of those of its allies.... In the Pacific Command, this mission is carried out primarily by means of a forward basing strategy."⁶ Like any strategy, forward basing has supporters and detractors. The major points of view will be discussed briefly.

Ever since we have stationed troops in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines those countries have not been attacked by any foreign power. But, who is to say they would have been attacked had we not stationed troops there? One of the major arguments against the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is the loss of the deterrent those troops constitute. Why, the critics ask, would the U.S. go to war over a small country in northeast Asia if no American lives are involved? The credibility of the U.S. deterrent is the involvement of U.S. personnel. Supporters of the withdrawal counter this argument by highlighting the new flexibility this gives U.S. policy. We are no longer immediately involved in another Korean war. The arguments and counter-arguments go back and forth, but suffice it to say deterrence is enhanced when troops are forward-based at the point of the threat.

Another aspect of the forward basing and deterrence question deals with flexibility. Our forward deployed forces are maintained in a high state of combat readiness.⁷ This readiness and their location gives them more flexibility and mobility than comparable stateside units in making a quick response wherever they are needed. A case in point is the Mayaguez incident. The helicopters used in the assault were based in Thailand, the Marines came from the Philippines, and

the ships were units of the Seventh Fleet operating out of Subic Bay, in the Philippines. Whether or not the action taken was the proper course is still being debated. But, without those forward based units the United States would not have had the option it chose to exercise in recovering the ship and its crew.

Since the end of the Vietnam War the emphasis of U.S. security policy in East Asia has shifted to the north. The emphasis now appears balanced between North and Southeast Asia. If the United States is to continue to play a credible major role in East Asian security questions the maintenance of forward bases in Japan and the Philippines is mandatory. A potentially aggressive nation will seriously believe in U.S. promises and treaties only if we have forces on scene to demonstrate our resolve. We do not use "proxy armies" of Cubans or any other nationality when we maintain a deterrent position. And, because we don't, we can maintain our position only through the maintenance of forward bases.

Northeast Asia is the only area where the interests of all four major Asian-Pacific powers - the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and China - intersect.⁸ The threat of major aggression involving the United States or its allies has diminished in the last five years, but relatively minor wars continue to plague East and Southeast Asia. Although the major threat has diminished, it is still present. To deter, and if deterrence fails, to meet that threat forward based U.S. forces must be maintained.

LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The United States has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. Through this and numerous unilateral declarations and statements the U.S. has made its position on nuclear proliferation clear. Nuclear power for peaceful purposes is fine but the spread of nuclear weapons technology is not. Proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to instability in that country's regional area. The difficulties in this policy arise when nuclear power-plant technology approaches nuclear weapons technology.

East Asia has been and continues to be an extremely unstable region. There has been one war or another going on almost continuously throughout this century. Governments can change overnight. What was once a fledgling democracy can become a "People's Democratic Republic" or a repressive military dictatorship. Either one of those are likely to use nuclear weapons much sooner than a more moderate government. With the spread of nuclear power and the closing of the technology gap between power-production and weapons production the possibility of weapons production is present and the probability of such production is increasing all the time. Although a fictional story, such a scenario is developed very clearly in Paul Erdman's The Crash of '79. For this reason the reluctance of the United States to share its power-production technology is understandable.

At this time there are three non-nuclear East Asia nations who have: (1) the technology to develop nuclear weapons; or (2) the perceived need to develop nuclear weapons. The nation which has the technology is Japan, and for reasons to be discussed later is not producing nuclear weapons by choice.⁹ The two which perceive a need for nuclear weapons are Taiwan and South Korea.¹⁰ There have been articles

in Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian newspapers, and other sources to indicate that these two countries are on the verge of developing nuclear weapons. These are the countries the United States should be most worried about in regard to nuclear proliferation. For the Taiwanese, nuclear weapons would make it virtually impossible for the People's Republic in the near future to mount a successful invasion of the island. For South Korea, under the Park regime, nuclear weapons would provide a greater guarantee of security should the U.S. Second Infantry Division be withdrawn. Such weapons would possibly give it enough confidence to try a "re-unification" from the South.

The United States position has been and continues to be that we will provide a "nuclear umbrella" for our allies.¹¹ Thus, if an ally is attacked with nuclear weapons the aggressor can expect retaliation from the U.S. With this guarantee the United States sees no military reason for any allied country to develop nuclear weapons. The flaw in U.S. logic comes when the ally perceives he isn't such an important ally that Uncle Sam is ready to trade Chicago or Los Angeles for the allied capitol. Twenty years ago it was taken for granted that the United States would look out for its allies to the point of committing its own forces. We did in Korea in 1950-53, in the Taiwan Strait, and on other occasions throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. With the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the retreat from Vietnam, the proposed withdrawal from Korea, the recognition of the PRC, and the general reduction in U.S. overseas commitments, these two countries have come to the conclusion, which I believe to be correct, that the United States' "nuclear umbrella" no longer covers them. Neither of

these countries has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This leaves United States policymakers with two choices. They can either devise a new way to provide a credible deterrent or assume that the Taiwanese and South Koreans will have their own nuclear capability in the near future. In view of the conflicting U.S. policy demands for (a) greater reliance on allies for their own defense and (b) nuclear non-proliferation, this problem will be extremely difficult for policymakers to resolve.

PROMOTION OF AND ASSISTANCE TO FRIENDLY NATIONS

Under the Nixon Doctrine,¹² which U.S. foreign policy still generally follows, self-defense and military assistance to friendly nations is to be emphasized as a part of U.S. security policy. One of the basic tenets is that the U.S. will provide assistance when requested. However, short of a nuclear confrontation the nation involved will be expected to provide its own manpower for defense.¹³ The Nixon Doctrine also calls for reduced U.S. force levels, basing the reductions on two assumptions. First, because of negotiations with adversaries, the threat those forces face is reduced. Second, because of increased strength and stability of our allies, there is less need for U.S. troop support. There have been several other reasons to support these reductions, including a scarcity of funds.

A look at the fiscal year 1980 Department of Defense Annual Report shows just how much U.S. security policy in East Asia now depends on promotion of and assistance to friendly nations. It states that with our ally Japan, South Korean forces backed by the United States, and

our Philippine bases, we are still a major Pacific power.¹⁴ If we remove the forces and base structure contributed by our friends and allies from that total we are left with pitifully little. This should indicate the continuing necessity of not only military support, but also political and economic assistance, for our Asian allies. Without them, their support, and their facilities we would be practically incapable of influencing any major event in the region. With them, we maintain freedom of action. That freedom allows us to intervene or remain on the sidelines, whichever is the appropriate choice.

There is more to security assistance than military aid and sales. In nations that are allies or independent we can help maintain their status through economic and developmental aid. In these areas Japan can play a key role. Japan can and should increase its "unattached" foreign aid. Too often, Japanese aid is "tied" to purchases from Japan or programs that in the end help Japan and not the receiving country.¹⁵ This kind of aid is often termed "economic aggression" or "economic imperialism." It usually leads to resentment and bitterness, if not outright hostility, in the receiving country.¹⁶ Making friends through a coordinated economic assistance policy is much better for our security than sending in troops, aircraft, or ships.

No matter how much we hope that aid programs will succeed, the military option must be available where vital United States and allied interests are concerned. Military intervention, if it is to be utilized, is greatly facilitated when friendly and helpful nations are nearby.

MODERATION OF SOVIET EXPANSION

The fiscal year 1980 Department of Defense Annual Report contends

that our overall position in East Asia is favorable to our interests.¹⁷

"But the current equilibrium is not necessarily permanent. Soviet military strength in Asia and the Pacific continues to grow, though at a moderate pace."¹⁸ It is important to note that while Soviet strength is steadily increasing our's is steadily decreasing. Why should the Soviets continue to increase their military strength in Asia? The obvious reason is the current state of relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. Another is to support the Soviet client state, Vietnam. And, a third is to gain influence in a resource rich region that has traditionally been a U.S. and Japanese preserve. All three objectives involve the necessity of increased Soviet influence and involvement in both the internal and external politics of East Asia nations. And, it has been the Soviet pattern to gain influence through the threat or use of military force.

It has been widely reported and accepted that the Soviet Union annually outspends the United States on military hardware, with a Gross National Product about half the size of ours.¹⁹ One wonders what the Soviets intend to do with such vast military potential. They have gone beyond the point of defensive armaments and have developed the ability to project considerable naval power. 'While the Soviet Union probably continues to assign priority to Europe in its military planning, nevertheless an objective observer in the Pacific sees a relentless expansion in Soviet military programs in the Far East.'²⁰ Soviet Far East military strength is outlined in the Japanese Defense White Paper for 1977.

The main body of Soviet ground and air forces is positioned to deter and defend against the Chinese. However, Soviet naval forces have been operating more and more beyond Japan. In 1976 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, acknowledged that the U.S. Navy could not operate in the Sea of Japan in the face of opposition from the enlarged Soviet Pacific Fleet.²¹ According to the Japan Defense Agency the Soviet Far East Fleet is more than double the tonnage of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.²² But, this comparison is strictly on gross tonnage, not combat capability. The Japanese report emphasizes the "sea traffic blockade capability"²³ of the large Soviet submarine fleet.

In any confrontation with China this increased Soviet naval activity is another "front" which must be faced by the People's Republic of China. Increased Soviet fleet maneuvers and port visits in East and Southeast Asian waters strengthen and support Soviet influence in client states like Vietnam. Support of Vietnam is one more link encircling China. This increased Soviet activity can be viewed as affecting the United States in two additional ways. First is the direct threat to the Seventh Fleet and other military forces which have traditionally been the decisive military units in the region. Second is the effect on the perceptions of our Asian allies regarding our superiority and resolve. When that superiority and resolve becomes questionable, Soviet political and economic benefits will increase as U.S. and Japanese benefits correspondingly decrease.

How then does Japan and U.S. security policy relate to moderating Soviet expansion? It would be very easy to readopt the "containment"

theory of the 1950s, but in this complicated era such simplistic solutions are not practical. The Japanese feel threatened by the Soviet Union. That will be discussed later on. The U.S. is challenged by the Soviet Union. In East Asia this challenge is in the form of protecting trade and resource supplies through political, economic, and if necessary, military means. If the United States is to remain a Pacific power this threat cannot be ignored. We must make every effort to promote and assist our allies. We must demonstrate our resolve to both our allies and the Soviets by maintaining the deterrent of our forward basing structure. History shows that the Soviet Union backs down only when the probable costs, political, military, or economic, outweigh the probable gains. We must insure that the probable cost of Soviet expansion is greater than the probable gains.

CHAPTER II

ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS

THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY: THE U.S. VIEW

The official title, "The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America"²⁴ is more commonly known as the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The original treaty was signed in San Francisco in 1951, immediately after the signing of the formal peace treaty ending WWII. The current revised version was signed in 1960.²⁵ This paper is not specifically concerned with the 1951 Treaty. It is concerned with how the United States views the 1960 Treaty.

Article II of the treaty is important and should be remembered. The key sentence, "They "(both parties)" will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them."²⁶ Just as important are Articles V and VI. The gist of Article V is that any attack on either party "in the territories under the administration of Japan"²⁷ would be a danger to both nations' "peace and safety."²⁸ Article VI is vital because it grants the United States use of "facilities and training areas in Japan."²⁹ Details of these basing arrangements are in a separate status-of-forces agreement.³⁰

Ever since the treaty was signed, the United States has been much more concerned with Articles V and VI than it has been with Article II. Whenever the U.S. talks about defense in Asia the 'Mutual Security Treaty' is mentioned, not the 'Mutual Cooperation Treaty'. In economic

matters it is rare for the United States to even mention Article II. It is important to remember that the Japanese view the treaty as having both security and economic implications.

The United States view of the treaty is one of providing for "equilibrium in the Pacific" as well as Japanese security.³¹ This broad view necessarily takes in more than Japan. The U.S. has viewed the treaty in this light for the last nineteen years. The article of the treaty that allows the United States to maintain her position as a major power in the Pacific is necessarily emphasized to a greater degree than the others. Without Article VI the United States position in East Asia would be far weaker, certainly below the level necessary to be a 'major power'.

In Article V the United States has taken the position that an attack on Japan is almost, but not quite, the same as an attack on the United States. As always, any U.S. military involvement would be "in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."³² This diplomatic clause allows the United States not to become involved if it determines involvement is not in its own best interests. Because of the large United States military and civilian presence in Japan, a major attack on Japan would undoubtedly draw some form of United States response. A major question posed in the last chapter still remains. Would the United States use nuclear weapons, possibly precipitating a major nuclear exchange, if Japan was attacked and the United States and/or Western Europe wasn't? The probability of a major attack on Japan alone is so low that both parties have left that difficult question unanswered.

So what is the United States' view of the Security Treaty? When the treaty was signed it was seen as a hedge against the threat of communism gaining undue influence in the Japanese political system. Since then, that threat has diminished and United States views of the treaty have changed accordingly. When the treaty was written, Japan was a defeated and defenseless nation. The Security Treaty was designed to allow Japan to recover from the war without the added burden of defense. It also guaranteed that the Japanese would not deem it necessary to rearm, thus threatening the stability of East Asia. At that time the United States was the dominant power in East Asia. The fact that the treaty gave the United States practically unlimited base rights was considered a quid-pro-quo for the United States defensive umbrella. Now the United States is no longer the dominant power. It is one of the dominant powers. The Japanese are no longer defenseless. The Japanese Self Defense Forces have some of the world's most sophisticated weapons. The security reasons for the treaty have changed.

The United States increasingly sees the security treaty as one of alliance rather than one of total dependence. The treaty is still seen almost exclusively in the security context by the U.S. In the United States view, Article II, on trade, is just an appendage. The formal security ties and the base rights remain as valid to Washington now as in the nineteen fifties.

FORMAL SECURITY RELATIONS

Formal security arrangements between Japan and the United States, in addition to the Mutual Security Treaty, exist. Since 1972 there has

been an annual meeting between the United States Secretary of Defense and the Japanese Defense Minister.³³

Of first importance in the U.S. Japanese government-to-government consultations is the Security Consultative Committee. The Security Consultative Committee was established to study subjects that relate to security and "that help promote understanding between the Japanese and United States governments and help strengthen cooperative relationships in the field of security."³⁴ The Committee's basis for establishment is an exchange of letters dated 19 January 1960, between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of Japan.³⁵ It has met annually since 1960.³⁶ The members from Japan include the Foreign Minister, the Defense Agency Director General, and others. The U.S. side is represented by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan who represents the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and others.³⁷ The exact duties and responsibilities of the Security Consultative Committee are difficult to determine because much of its work is, by necessity, classified. After reading many Foreign Broadcast Information Service translations of the Japanese press on military matters, it is apparent that any major change in U.S.-Japan security relations goes through the Security Consultative Committee. My belief is that any combined exercises, plans, etc. must clear the Security Consultative Committee before the exercise or plan can be ordered. The Security Consultative Committee also acts as the overseer for several other joint planning groups.

The next committee of importance is the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation which was formed in July 1976, as a subcommittee to the

Security Consultative Committee. As a result of meetings between President Ford and Prime Minister Miki, and between Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Defense Agency Director General Sakata,³⁸ this subcommittee was agreed upon. The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation determines means of Japanese-American cooperation within the bounds of the mutual security treaty. And, to effectively attain the purpose of the treaty, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation provides guidelines for joint operations by United States forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces.³⁹ The members of the subcommittee are one level below the members of the Security Consultative Committee. For Japan, there is the Director General of American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, the Director of the Defense Agency's Defense Policy Bureau, and the Director of the Self Defense Forces Joint Staff. On the United States side is the Minister of the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces in Japan.⁴⁰ As always, others from both sides participate as necessary. Also if necessary, the subcommittee can establish additional departments for specialization and assistance.⁴¹

The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation held four meetings in its first nine months of existence and established three departments - operations, intelligence, and logistical support.⁴² The subcommittee recognized problems of prior consultation as an area for study and consultation, but specifically excluded Japan's three non-nuclear principles and constitutional limitations from those studies.⁴³ These specific exclusions highlight the sensitivity of these issues in Japan and will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. The three main subjects of studies and consultation are: (1) What might happen

when Japan comes under the threat of or direct armed attack, (2) Asian politico-military problems that affect Japan's security, and (3) Others, to include joint planning, maneuvers, exercises, etc.⁴⁴ "The activities of the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation are expected to steadily promote studies and consultation on means of Japanese-American cooperation which are vital to the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. security system."⁴⁵

Another formal group is the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. It was originated by the Status of Forces Agreement to deal with problems of that agreement.⁴⁶ Its biweekly meetings are attended by the American Affairs Bureau Director General in the Foreign Ministry, the Director General of the Defense Facilities Agency, and others representing Japan. The United States is represented by the U.S. Embassy Councillor, Chief of Staff of U.S. Forces in Japan, and others.⁴⁷ This group deals with the day-to-day problems associated with U.S. servicemen and their families stationed in Japan.

There have been, and will probably continue to be, unofficial working-level consultations on security issues at the vice-minister or under-secretary level, as the need arises. One more formal organ, outside normal diplomatic channels, is the Security Consultative Group which is discussed in the Japanese Defense White Paper, 1977. It was established on January 19, 1973 and held twenty-three meetings as of November 8, 1976.⁴⁹ Its purpose is "consultation and adjustment on the implications of the Security Treaty and its related arrangements."⁵⁰

The civilian members are one level below the Security Consultative Committee, but the military and Japan Defense Agency personnel are at the same level and more numerous than on the Security Consultative

Committee. It is important to note that this is the first time a uniformed officer of the Japan Self Defense Forces has been listed as a member of a bi-lateral committee. This listing is an example of the persistent progress in influence and responsibility of uniformed officers in the Japanese Defense Agency. Both the frequency of meetings and positions of its members indicate that this is an important group, on a par with the Security Consultative Committee.

The final group is a new committee, the name of which is unavailable to me. It was formed as an outgrowth of the Security Consultative Committee meeting in November, 1978. At that meeting the Security Consultative Committee approved guidelines for emergency action, defining the roles to be played by U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japan Self Defense Forces.⁵¹ In planning the implementation of these new guidelines Japan will be represented by the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (equivalent to U.S. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the U.S. will be represented by the Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan.⁵² This is a significant step toward defense cooperation because it is the first time direct military to military talks have been given "official recognition."⁵³

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Where nuclear weapons are involved, calm discussions often become emotional arguments. When discussing such weapons, a calm discussion is required. Such sobering power requires clear, rational, unemotional thinking. Japan and the United States have both established policies on nuclear weapons. Both have thought clearly, rationally, and for the

most part, unemotionally about their policies. The policies are not direct opposites, but they are not very much alike either.

Ever since the United States first developed nuclear weapons it has discouraged other nations from acquiring them. Instead, the United States has provided a "nuclear umbrella" for its allies. The general tone of most "nuclear umbrella" guarantees has been the promise of nuclear retaliation by the United States against any aggressor who uses nuclear weapons on a United States ally. In the case of Japan this guarantee has been stated often. In April, 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, restated the guarantee. In his speech before the Japan Society he said "Above all, we shall sustain the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan. For Japan this treaty offers strategic protection...."⁵⁴ This guarantee is extremely important to the functioning of Japanese defense policy.

In the Japanese Defense White Paper, 1977, under "Defense Concepts" is the statement "Against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States."⁵⁵ This is a very straightforward statement of Japanese policy and the importance of United States strategic protection to Japan. The other major Japanese position on nuclear weapons was stated by Prime Minister Sato in 1971. "Japanese policy on nuclear weapons stipulates that:

- (1) Japan shall not produce nuclear weapons.
- (2) Japan shall not possess nuclear weapons.
- (3) Japan shall not permit the importation of nuclear weapons."⁵⁶

This statement is known as the "three non-nuclear principles." It has been the guiding light of Japanese nuclear policy since its conception.

There are indications that the absolute adherence to these principles may be slipping. The statement in the 1970 Defense White Paper that defensive nuclear weapons may be constitutional, but not Japanese government policy, is one indication.⁵⁷ Another is the recent lack of press outcry and public protest that used to accompany United States nuclear powered ship visits.⁵⁸ Testifying before a Congressional committee, retired Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque, USN, said that United States naval vessels⁵⁹ did not off-load nuclear weapons before entering Japanese ports. An unidentified "Pentagon official said it was no secret that such vessels called in foreign ports, including Japan, with the weapons on board."⁶⁰ This, of course, drew loud protests from anti-nuclear groups in Japan. The Japanese government then denied any knowledge of the matter.⁶¹ Then, "American sources finally revealed that a secret agreement, made in 1960 and reconfirmed in 1972 during talks between United States President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, permitted the unquestioned transit of United States nuclear weapons through Japan, not only by ship, but by plane as well."⁶² As in all such cases the U.S. government neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. ships or aircraft. The massive protests died out rather quickly and have not occurred since then. There has even been a vocal minority who suggest that the U.S. nuclear deterrent would be enhanced by allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to at least transit Japan.

The lack of emotional outcry in response to that last suggestion indicates that the Japanese are finally to the point where they can rationally discuss nuclear weapons. "When former Prime Minister

Eisaku Sato was asked about LaRocque's testimony, he declared that the nation's abhorrence of nuclear weapons should be reconsidered since such weapons have become commonplace."^{62A} Although now there is discussion about nuclear weapons, the Japanese are not likely to revise the three non-nuclear principles, or their reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the near future. One reason for this open discussion of nuclear weapons has been growing doubt about the credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella.

United States nuclear weapons policy is all classified. Anything written here is only the author's logical conclusions drawn from considerable research into unclassified sources. As stated in the first chapter, both the United States and Japan feel that the probability of a nuclear attack on Japan in the absence of a world-wide nuclear war is very low. It is extremely doubtful that the United States would use nuclear weapons first if Japan were attacked by conventional forces. Both countries should be able to maintain Japan's territorial integrity with their combined conventional forces as they are presently deployed. Therefore, the United States can say that Japan is under the United States "nuclear umbrella" with little fear of having to use nuclear weapons before she herself is attacked. The possibility still remains that Japan could be attacked with nuclear weapons and the U.S. is not. This puts the President of the United States in a difficult situation. Would he carry out the promise of nuclear retaliation and risk American cities for Tokyo or Osaka? No one, probably not even the President, knows for sure. And that has the Japanese worried. The United States will continue to officially espouse the "nuclear umbrella", but there

will always be uncertainty.

PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SECURITY RELATIONS

One of the key elements in any relationship between two countries is perception. When two countries interact they are dealing in perception, which more often than not, may or may not be synonymous with fact. Stresses and strains in international relations often occur because either one or both sides are dealing with false perceptions. There are three major areas where perceptions and misperceptions affect U.S.-Japan security relations.

The first major area is Japanese perceptions of "dictation" from Washington regarding security policy. Like any major country, Japan likes to feel its policies are determined independently by its own government. Too often, in the past, the Japan Defense Agency has been in the position where its policies appeared to be conceived in the United States. United States and Japanese security policies in East Asia are closely related and "...as long as the armed services maintain close ties with their American counterparts, Japan's defense and weapons policies will continue to be well coordinated with those of the United States."⁶³ But, that does not mean that the United States "dictates" security policy to Japan. It does mean that United States and Japanese security policies, determined and analyzed independently, are closely aligned. Each nation's policy is strengthened by the partnership of the mutual security treaty. The United States, as the major partner in the alliance, has the obligation to refrain from dictation and

consult with Japan just like it does with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The opposition parties in the Japanese political system have long made effective use of the perception that the United States dominates Japanese security policy. They used to be unanimous in their call for disarmament of Japan and abrogation of the mutual security treaty. Some have softened that position in the last several years. The Japan Communist Party is still opposed to any continuation of the treaty. The Japan Communist Party calls the new guidelines on United States-Japanese Defense cooperation "a 'blueprint' for automatic participation of the Self Defense Forces of Japan in a U.S. war of aggression."⁶⁴ The perception of "dictation", although decreasing, is still present. United States officials should be careful not to force issues that are politically difficult domestically on the Japanese. A misperception that also causes problems are assumptions that Japan is providing bases for United States imperialist aggression at no cost.

Japan's constitution is known as the peace constitution because in it Japan renounces the right to wage war.⁶⁵ This idealistic philosophy has led several of the opposition parties to the conclusion that Japan is obviously not a target because she poses no one any threat. Therefore, all the United States bases do is involve Japan in confrontations between the U.S. and USSR and give the United States staging areas for aggression like Korea and Vietnam. The opposition parties then postulate that without United States bases, East Asia would notice reduced tension and greater security for all, especially

Japan. The advocates of this theory, for the most part, also believe in balanced relations between Moscow, Beijing and Washington.

The major misperception made in the United States is that Japan is getting a "free ride" in defense. The advocates of this belief say that the only things the security treaty does are to: (1) require the U.S. to protect Japan, and (2) pay for the bases that provide that protection. It concludes that the United States is subsidizing Japan's strong and growing economy and continued economic growth because the Japanese don't spend even 1% of their Gross National Product for defense. The United States, they argue, is picking up the entire bill. As the U.S.-Japan trade deficit increases more people join in this belief. Neither this perception nor the "free bases" perception are entirely wrong.

It is true that the United States enjoys the use of facilities in Japan for basing its western Pacific forces. It's not true that this is without cost. The Japanese economy benefits from the large numbers of American servicemen who spend their paychecks in Japan. Those forces are also committed to Japan's defense, the fact that some Japanese don't perceive a threat, notwithstanding. And finally, the presence of those forces provides a balancing power to maintain stability in that unbalanced corner of the world.

In response to the "free ride" theory it is true that Japan benefits from the United States presence. But, it is not a "free ride". Japan pays about ten percent of the annual cost for United States bases there.^{66A} The United States does benefit substantially from its bases in Japan.

Several reasons were given in Chapter One. Additionally, a seldom mentioned reason is that because we are allied with and defending Japan, Japan does not feel the need to rearm on a large, pre-WWII scale. If that were to happen the result could only be fear, uncertainty, and instability throughout East and Southeast Asia. For this reason alone the price we pay in defending Japan and maintaining our bases is very low.

FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES FORCES AND THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Cooperation between United States forces and the Japan Self Defense Forces is increasing. Japan is starting to share the costs of maintaining American forces in Japan. The two countries are involved in more joint military exercises, planning talks, and staff talks than ever before. For the past several years there have been annual cabinet level meetings on security between the two countries. Japan has proposed establishing "a cabinet-level consultative organ separate from" the Security Consultative Committee.⁶⁶ These different forms of cooperation can only end up strengthening the United States-Japan mutual security treaty.

There are several probable reasons why Japan would want to share the costs for United States forces in Japan. One is to help dissolve the perception discussed earlier that Japan is getting a "free ride" in national defense. Another is to help decrease the large balance of payments surplus Japan enjoys. And a third is to persuade a budget-minded United States government to keep the forces there rather

than send them home. Cost-sharing plans have received more attention in Japan than in the United States. Secretary of Defense Brown went to Japan at the end of November, 1978. On November 2, 1978 Prime Minister Fukuda said Japan was ready to increase its share of maintaining United States forces in Japan from 14.2 billion yen to 20.2 billion yen.⁶⁷ Back in May, 1978 Defense Agency Director General Kanemaru advised Prime Minister Fukuda that Japan "consider increasing its share of United States defense costs in Japan."⁶⁸

For some reason this cost-sharing has not received much attention in the American press. One possibility is that it might be classified information. A more probable one is doubt about the reaction of the American public. One connotation that can be drawn from cost-sharing is that United States forces in Japan have become "mercenaries" hired by Japan for her own defense. While this takes quite a stretch of imagination, it is possible. There is a lot of pride in the United States and the fact that the United States isn't completely supporting its overseas forces could hurt that pride. Nevertheless, the cost-sharing is not only continuing, but is increasing.

Another area of cooperation between United States forces and the Japan Self Defense Force is joint military exercises. Because exercises are plans for wars, few details are available to the public. But often, general statements as to the nature of the exercises are made in press releases. Because the Japanese are expected to handle the manpower requirements for all but a massive invasion,⁶⁹ the U.S. Army and the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force will seldom conduct joint exercises. The U.S. Navy and the Maritime Self Defense Force are both working in

the same area - anti-submarine warfare. The U.S. Air Force and the Air Self Defense Force also have common missions. One would expect these two services to conduct more extensive joint exercises than the Army. In the Japanese Defense White Paper 1977, the only exercises listed were the anti-submarine warfare exercises. The exercises involved several ships and aircraft flights from both nations' forces. The United States does not keep an unclassified listing of all its joint exercises with foreign countries. Such exercises strengthen the deterrent value of the mutual security treaty. They also prepare forces from both nations for operating together, as they may be doing, should the deterrent fail. Joint operations are an excellent way to increase total force capabilities and options without increasing either country's force totals.

As indicated earlier, there are several official channels of communication between Japan and the United States regarding defense relations. Until 1978, none of these channels were concerned with planning and coordinating joint operations between the uniformed services of each country. The establishment of a group of officers from each country in order to implement defense cooperation guidelines⁷⁰ can, for all practical purposes, be called a joint staff for planning. Such a staff will be of great use in planning future joint exercises and planning coordinated intelligence, logistics and other support for emergency situations.

CHAPTER III

JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY

DEFINITION OF PERCEIVED THREAT

Western analysts will usually agree that "Japan is in an enviable position in that it is difficult to picture direct military threats against her."⁷¹ It is doubtful that China or the Soviet Union would attack Japan "except in the context of an all-out East-West war."⁷² That analysis, no matter how correct it may be, does not completely account for Japanese attitudes. The Japanese perceive a threat, whether it is real or not. Japan considers the strengthening of the Soviet Pacific Fleet a threat to its security, according to Vice Defense Minister Koh Maruyama.⁷³ Another major security issue between the Japanese and the Soviets is the so-called 'Northern Territories' dispute.

The Northern Territories are four islands off the northeast tip of Hokkaido that Japan claims the Soviet Union illegally retained after the end of WWII (see Appendix 2). The Soviets claim that the islands are part of the Kuriles and because Japan gave up all claim to the Kuriles, the islands belong to them. Japan would like to establish better relations with the Soviet Union, "but believes that eradicable tension will remain unless the Northern Territories are returned."⁷⁴ The Soviet position is equally tough, but at the opposite end of the spectrum. The official Soviet position on the Northern Territory issue is, "such an issue is nonexistent."⁷⁵ Neither side has made any

indication of concession and it appears that this confrontation will go on indefinitely.

The Northern Territories are important to Japan in a psychological sense because they are the last 'Japanese' territory occupied after WWII that has not been returned. Many fishing families were moved to Hokkaido by the Soviets and have maintained continuous presence on the Japanese government to help them go home. Finally, it is a point of national pride that those islands which have been "Japanese" in the past are no longer. The Soviets do not feel they can negotiate this question because of the precedent it would set regarding all other territory it has annexed since WWII (along the Chinese border, Finland, Poland, Rumania, and Iran).

One month after Japan signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union moved twenty-five hundred troops onto one of the four islands claimed by Japan.⁷⁶ Four months after the first buildup, Japan now charges the Soviet Union with increasing the garrison to about 5000 men, building bases on two of the islands, deploying surface-to-air missiles, improving port facilities, and lengthening runways.⁷⁷ The Japanese feel "this deed on the Soviet side is a very unfriendly gesture to Japan."⁷⁸ These actions and the increasing size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, especially submarines, have the Japanese understandably wary.

The only other area that could be considered a threat to Japan is the Korean peninsula. The Japanese have historically called Korea a "dagger" at the heart of Japan. Peace and stability on the peninsula

are considered vital by Japan.⁷⁹ A major change in the present situation on the Korean peninsula or a likelihood of a major conflict there could trigger "expansion and reinforcement of Japan's defense structure to conform to changes" in the international environment.⁸⁰ A major war or the Korean peninsula would raise fears in Japan of Soviet or Chinese involvement and upset the delicate balance in the region. Japanese relations with both Koreas are somewhat less than warm, though better with the South than with the North. As long as the status quo is maintained, Japan will continue to work with both Koreas to reduce the threat of conflict.

Japan no longer feels threatened by the People's Republic of China. The opening of diplomatic relations in 1972 and the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978 have created what might be called a "China Syndrome" in Japan. Many Japanese companies are actively pursuing the limited profits to be made as China attempts to modernize its economy. The Japanese people, in general, feel a cultural affinity with China. There are some Japanese who feel that Taiwan should still be recognized,⁸¹ but they are a small minority. The only threatening area in Sino-Japanese relations is the realization that China is trying to obtain Japan's support against the Soviet Union. This is threatening because of the reaction of the Soviets toward Japan.

China would like to have Japan as an ally. Most observers can see the possibilities for a very effective anti-Soviet "alliance", virtually shutting the Soviets out of East Asia. One month after the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, the Deputy Chief of the

General Staff of the People's Liberation Army made a five-day unofficial visit to Tokyo. He met with leaders of the Japan Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces and toured defense facilities and industrial plants.⁸² Such visits do not necessarily indicate an alliance, but they do indicate that neither country feels threatened by the other.

The only territorial problem between China and Japan is the Senkaku Islands. This area is complicated by the claim of the Nationalist Chinese as well. The Senkakus lie only 110 miles northeast of Taiwan. They are 250 miles east of Foochow on mainland China and 250 southwest of Okinawa. The main reason all three parties claim the islands is not for their fishing rights, but because of the oil that is thought to be under the continental shelf in that area. In a move probably designed to hasten Japanese signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, China reportedly gave indirect recognition to Japan's claim.^{82A} No one has yet made effective demonstrations of sovereignty, but Japan began to review possible methods in August 1978.⁸³ The main possibility for trouble now is if the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan intend to force their claim against Japan. Such a move would undoubtedly bring the People's Republic of China back into the picture, either pursuing its own claim or supporting the Japanese.

JAPANESE SECURITY OBJECTIVES - STABILITY AND GOOD RELATIONS

Japanese security objectives emphasize peace and stability. The Japanese economy would collapse if Japan were involved in a war. International trade ties bring Japan almost all her raw materials and deliver most of her finished products. Peace for Japan is vital.

Stability in East Asia is very important. Any disruption of trade because of local, non-Japanese conflicts would not be a mortal blow to Japan's economy, but it would hurt. Several areas where this is possible are Korea, Taiwan, People's Republic of China, and to a lesser extent, Vietnam. One must also remember that Japan will not, in all probability, use military methods of enforcing stability anywhere outside the Japanese home islands.

In Korea, stability is important because Japan trades almost equally with both the North and the South. Any war there would disrupt that trade. Japan also trades with both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Instability or pressure from one China or the other to limit trade would not be welcome there either. Japanese trade with Vietnam is not on the same scale as Korea or China. However, there is potential to participate in Vietnamese reconstruction programs. Problems such as the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict will retard any investment opportunities.

A major Japanese security objective is maintenance of friendly relations with the United States and the countries of East Asia and secondly the rest of the world. This is particularly true concerning countries that Japan is dependent upon for her economic security. These include Arab oil producers, those who control the shipping lanes, those who supply natural resources, and the United States. Japan rapidly shifted allegiance from Israel to the Arabs when the 1973 oil embargo was imposed and has since sold developmental technology and support to the oil producing countries. Because Japan can not escort

its ships everywhere they go, particularly to the Persian Gulf, the states that control strategic straits are cultivated by non-military methods to stay friendly with Japan. Non-military methods of cultivation include developmental aid, co-production schemes, grants and loans, setting up labor intensive industries, and covert aid to governmental leaders. The countries that supply most of the raw materials for Japan's industries are cultivated in these ways also. Friendly relations with the United States are vital because (1) the United States supplies the militarily secure environment for Japan's economy, (2) America is Japan's largest individual trading partner, and (3) Japan receives many of its raw materials, timber, coal, etc., from the United States.

It should, by now, be obvious that in Japan, security and the good health of the economy are almost synonymous. The Japanese feel if economic relations are under strain, "a further doubt must also arise in relation to defense links where these exist."⁸⁴ But, there are some contradictions in the economic-security objectives. Why should the Japanese, who are worried about the increasing size and capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, sell the Soviet Union a large floating dry-dock that reduces Soviet problems in deploying a KIEV-class aircraft carrier to the Pacific?⁸⁵ It was probably a political concession in response to the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and it was a sale that could lead to future economic ties. This incident is indicative of the general linkage between Japanese security, political and economic policies and brings to mind several

conclusions. Japan will pursue economic and political ties with all nations in an effort to avoid military confrontation. Economic and political motives are more important than military-security motives in any international relationship. If the economic and political objectives do not suffer, then military-security objectives may be pursued. In summation, political and economic first, then military security.

THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Because of its constitutional limitations, Japan does not have an Army, Navy or Air Force. But, Japan does have the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The distinction appears to be an exercise in semantics, but there is a difference. There is a basic premise underlying the name "Self-Defense Force" that is not present when Americans speak of "the military." The premise is made clear in the words Self-Defense. Unlike U.S. forces that operate all over the world, Japan's forces are restricted to defending only the home islands. And then, only after they have been attacked. Pre-emptive strikes are unconstitutional. This idea becomes clear in the mission of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

Unlike United States forces, Japan does not state a broad mission for its forces in a single sentence or paragraph. Instead, the mission of the Japan Self-Defense Forces is outlined in a Standard Defense Program Outline. The outline is based on the premise that the domestic and international situation "will not undergo any major changes for some time to come" and the following three ideas:

(1) "Japan's defense structure should primarily possess the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support."

(2) "Such defense preparedness should enable Japan to maintain a full surveillance posture during peacetime, and cope effectively with conflict to the extent of limited and small scale aggression."

(3) "This defense posture should be capable of adapting smoothly to meet any serious changes in the situation around Japan which might require such adaptation."⁸⁶

To accomplish this mission, the Self-Defense Forces must be capable of dealing with the immediate power projection capabilities of any potential adversary. Their surveillance arms must be capable of detecting changes in the immediate capability of any adversary. This change must be detected in time to allow for either a build-up of the Self-Defense Forces or arrival of assistance from the United States. Should an adversary increase his immediate projection capabilities, the Self-Defense Forces should be able to increase its defensive capabilities to an effective level within its existing organization. It's not necessary for the Self-Defense Forces to be ready to repel a major invasion that would be detected during preparation. The Self-Defense Forces should be able to repel, for example, a surprise Soviet landing on Hokkaido that originally appeared to be an amphibious exercise headed for the Kurile Islands. The force levels necessary under this Standard Defense Force Program are tabulated in Appendix 3.

The Self-Defense Forces have been described as one of the best equipped conventional forces in the world. The major types and quantities of equipment are tabulated in Appendix 4. In addition to

those listed, in December 1977, Japan decided to procure two new aircraft from the United States. The F-15 fighter plane and the P-3C maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare airplane will soon be introduced into the Self-Defense Forces.⁸⁷ These planes are scheduled to replace others in the Self-Defense Forces inventory that are becoming obsolete.

Not only are some of Japan's planes becoming obsolete, some old Japanese ideas about defense are changing also. When plans for procuring the F-15 were being discussed in the government, some opposition parties questioned the acquisition on legal grounds. By law, Japan has limited herself to defensive armament only. The retention of bomb-sight and mid-air refueling capability on the F-15 was called a change in the government's definition of 'defensive capability'.⁸⁸ The Japanese Defense Agency said it was neither a significant change nor unconstitutional.⁸⁹ The Agency also stated that self-defense is relative and changes over time.⁹⁰ Whenever a weapon is capable of being used outside the home islands it faces charges that it is unconstitutional because it has offensive potential.

These restrictions make it difficult for a military force trying to accomplish its mission. Another example of restriction is the Japan Defense Agency statement to the Diet stating that Japan was not planning to arm merchant ships for anti-submarine warfare defense.⁹¹ It is illegal to do so now. Indicative of changing attitudes toward restrictions, in this case the director of the cabinet Legislation Bureau added that changing the law for self-defense would not be unconstitutional.⁹²

The Japan Self-Defense Forces are intended to serve strictly on Japanese soil in a defensive mode. This has even precluded their involvement in United Nations peace-keeping duties. Reasons for this attitude include a fear of the revival of an expansionist military, a sincere belief that military forces overseas do more harm than good, and a belief that lack of offensive potential gives adversaries no reason to fear or attack Japan.

THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY AND JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The position of the Japan Defense Agency in the government of Japan is not as important or influential as is the position of the Department of Defense in the American government. In Japan, the Defense Agency is an agency headed by a Director-General appointed by the Prime Minister. It is not a cabinet-level agency. There is more emphasis on civilian control of the military establishment than in the United States. There are no civilian career positions in the Japan Defense Agency, so civilian employees are "borrowed" from different ministries. Naturally, those employees' loyalties usually remain with the parent ministry and not the Japan Defense Agency.

The Japan Defense Agency does not work alone in formulating Japanese security policy. Influence is exerted by the Japan Defense Agency, the bureaucracy, and most importantly by the political parties. Security policy in Japan is much more politicized than it is in the United States. Big business exerts some influence, but not as much as it does in the United States. Within the bureaucracy, the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs has the greatest influence on security policy. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry exerts some influence. The Finance Ministry has a major input into security policy through the budget.

All of the above 'actors' will influence security policy to a greater or lesser degree. The Japan Defense Agency, being a part of the Office of the Prime Minister, will usually present its proposals through the Liberal Democratic Party to the Diet for approval. There has been an interesting example of policy formulation in action for the past year that illustrates this process rather well.

It all started with the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council's forced resignation. In July 1978, General Hiroomi Kurisu said that in the event of an attack, his commanders would have to take "supra-legal action" if they wanted an immediate response.⁹³ Now the Self-Defense Forces can not take any action without the approval of the civilian chiefs.⁹⁴ That statement caused some quick questioning in the Diet. On 28 July 1978, the Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency said studies of legislative requirements for Self-Defense Forces emergency action would be speeded up.⁹⁵ He also welcomed "constructive opinions" from the frontline units, but warned them about speaking publicly.⁹⁶ On 8 August 1978, it was reported that twenty Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces staff personnel began the study of how the Self-Defense Forces should react to national security emergencies.⁹⁷ The study is expected to take two years to complete.⁹⁸ In the middle of August 1978 there were several statements

made by Japan Defense Agency officials clarifying ambiguous definitions of currently authorized Self-Defense Forces actions. On August 17, 1978 the last opposition party made its position on the proposed emergency legislation known. Komeito joined the Democratic Socialist Party and the New Liberal Club in favoring legislation, while the Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist Party, and the United Social Democrats are opposed.¹⁰⁰

Komeito also made its qualification saying civilian control must be emphasized in both the legislation and the Self-Defense Forces.¹⁰¹

On 29 August 1978 the military chiefs of the Self-Defense Forces said they hoped the Diet would legislate some way for them to act in the event of a surprise attack.¹⁰²

On 30 August 1978, one of the upper-level civilians in the Japan Defense Agency said in a television program that the study should authorize the Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency and not the Prime Minister to mobilize the Self-Defense Forces.¹⁰³

On 7 September 1978 the first appearance of the "cooling off" of this issue came from a Liberal Democratic Party leader and former Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency. Mr. Nakasone went beyond the immediate question of whether or not there should be legislation and said because actions during national emergencies might violate private rights, the government should provide compensation to those whose rights were violated.¹⁰⁴

The Japan Defense Agency also fell back to say its study was to see how to "make the Self-Defense Forces take smooth and effective action in case of a national emergency."¹⁰⁵ It also said no bill would appear in the near future and reaffirmed the doctrines of civilian control

and prime ministerial approval before the use of the Self-Defense Forces.^{105A} The study is still going on.

This entire process of comments from many sources will undoubtedly intensify when the study is published. The Finance Ministry is sure to get involved if any expenditures are called for (new command, control, and communications equipment). The Foreign Ministry will be questioning its effects on relations with other countries, especially East Asians. Each of the opposition parties will be comparing it to their own doctrines concerning defense. What changes will come when this whole program is completed are unknown.

The Japan Defense Agency, just like the U. S. Department of Defense, must ask the legislature to approve its budget each year. Because the Japan Defense Agency does not have a cabinet minister representing it in the Diet, its "slice of pie" is often reduced by the other more powerful ministries. The Japan Defense Agency has annually increased the defense budget, but keeping it below 1% of the gross national product. That figure is the unofficial "ceiling" that is acceptable throughout the country. If it were to go above that, great turmoil in the Diet would ensue amid charges of militarism. The defense budget has increased in real terms but stayed below 1% of gross national product because the gross national product has increased greatly each year.

In November 1978, the Japan Defense Agency said the Finance Ministry was likely to cut its budget.¹⁰⁶ The 1979 budget calls for a 12.3% increase over 1978, while gross national product grows about

10%.¹⁰⁷ Preliminary estimates put the budget below .9% of gross national product again, prompting the Defense Minister and other Japan Defense Agency leaders "to fight hard for a .9% of the gross national product level in next year's budget."¹⁰⁸ The Japan Defense Agency must play politics for its budget just like the U.S. Department of Defense, but from a much weaker position.

THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES MUTUAL SECURITY SYSTEM - THE JAPANESE VIEW

The Japan-United States mutual security system is the mutual security treaty, status of forces agreements, and the various defense related diplomatic notes, protocols, etc., that the two governments have exchanged. The United States and Japanese views of this system have reached a point where the major differences have all but disappeared. The only ones that remain are relatively minor definitions of spheres of action or degrees of cooperation. There are several major provisions and responsibilities that both sides agree on.

Both sides agree on Article V in the Mutual Security Treaty, which is the responsibility for responding to an attack on Japan. There have been minor disagreements over Article VI, which deals with the basing of American forces in Japan. During the Vietnam War there was public protest against United States forces transiting Japan using local bases because they were being used in a war not related to Japanese security. Both sides generally agree that in the event of an attack on Japan, Japanese forces would provide defense for Japan while American forces would support them as required and conduct the offensive actions against the aggressor. Washington would probably

like to see greater Japanese interest in assuming operational commitments. But, the Japanese are firmly committed to defensive operations only.

The Japanese feel very strongly about Washington's obligation to consult with them. Tokyo is concerned that Washington might make "major changes" in American forces in Japan, their equipment, and the use of United States bases in Japan for combat operations outside Japan. The Japanese consider nuclear weapons as a "major change" of equipment.¹⁰⁹ The United States has not specifically said it considers nuclear weapons a "major change."¹¹⁰ This has led to incidents like the one described earlier involving the transport of nuclear weapons in American naval vessels. In general, however, Japan views the provisions and responsibilities of the mutual security system like the United States does.

The government of Japan actively supports the continuation of the mutual security system, and particularly the treaty. The Chairman of Japan's Council on National Security Problems had several ideas on this subject. He said maintenance of the Security Treaty is "extremely important and of great significance for the following reasons:

(1) Japan is one of the Western-type nations politically and economically, (2) the Treaty contributes to Japan's security, and (3) the Treaty contributes to stability throughout East Asia."¹¹¹ He also said, that the military aspects of the relationship should be overshadowed by economic and political ties.¹¹²

Since the early 1970s, Japan has pursued a course in foreign

policy that is not exactly parallel to U.S. policy, but security policy has paralleled U.S. policy. Explanations for this vary. Some see it as a revival of true Japanese international independence,¹¹³ others as just looking out for Japan's national interests (continuity of imports). One Japanese writer implies some resentment of the United States dominance of Japan's security policy when he says, 'One of the covert functions of the Treaty, not directly implied by any clause, is to guarantee in effect that Japan's economic power will not be used for military purposes.'¹¹⁴ But, as that writer and many others have concluded, "the disappearance of the treaty would only heighten tension."¹¹⁵ For the foreseeable future then, Japan's optimal course in security policy is to maintain the security system and the Security Treaty as they are now. An independent security policy will not, in all probability, be pursued as long as the Liberal Democratic Party is in power. The Liberal Democratic Party does not appear threatened by any single party or coalition of opposition parties.

The opposition parties in Japan debate the necessity for the United States security relationship. Those of the conservative, right-wing advocate amending Article IX of the constitution to legitimize the Self-Defense Forces as an Army, Navy, and Air Force.¹¹⁶ Very few advocate nuclear weapons, but all say that option should remain open. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the left-wing liberals. They all used to advocate abolition of the Self-Defense Forces, abrogation of the Mutual Security Treaty, and unarmed neutrality for Japan.

The government of Japan bases its argument for continuation of the Mutual Security Treaty on the premise that it is the only economical, logical defense for Japan. Anyone with a basic understanding of nuclear weapons capabilities and a world atlas can see that Japan is indefensible against a nuclear strike. With the majority of Japan's population and industry concentrated in a narrow strip of the already small islands, only a few weapons need to penetrate any defenses to be effective in destroying the economic infrastructure. To build a deterrent force from scratch is possible, but the cost would be prohibitive. Not only would a nuclear deterrent force not protect a vulnerable Japan and be very expensive, it would also heighten the fears in many East Asian nations of a domineering Japan. The United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty can not protect Japan against a nuclear attack, but it does provide a large deterrent at minimal cost without frightening other East Asian nations. The Japan Socialist Party advocated "a specific plan for dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces" in November 1978.¹¹⁷ The Japan Socialist Party, like other opposition parties, has realized that the large majority of the population now supports the Self-Defense Forces.¹¹⁸ In the same article that revealed the dissolution plan, the Japan Socialist Party toned down the "traditional view that the Self-Defense Forces was unconstitutional."¹¹⁹ Middle-of-the-road opposition parties have recently adopted approval of the Self-Defense Forces and the Mutual Security Treaty.¹²⁰ This coalescing of opinion has led some knowledgeable observers to the conclusion the security "debate" in Japan is not

really a debate, but just an extension of domestic political conflicts and issues.¹²¹

THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AND SECURITY

Very little is published outside of Japan on the attitudes of the Japanese public toward security issues. The two major sources of opinion polls inside Japan are the major national daily newspapers and the Secretariat of the Cabinet. There is no appreciable difference in results of these two sources. Cabinet polls were taken in 1969, 1972, and 1975. Approximately 2,500 persons were interviewed individually. The results, by question, are reproduced in Appendix 5.

The results indicate quite clearly that the Japanese public is satisfied with the Self-Defense Force as it is constituted today. Any major changes, either increasing or decreasing, would likely create political problems for the government. Public demonstrations led by the opposition from the left or right (depending upon the change) could be expected. Reliance on diplomacy is the preferred method of avoiding conflict, with a gradually increasing Self-Defense Force and the Mutual Security Treaty to back it up. Opinions varied on what individual reactions to an invasion would be. On the defense budget, the vast majority favored either maintaining it at its present level or decreasing it. The budget has hovered between six and seven percent of the national budget and .85 to .9 percent of gross national product. This budget opinion is a clear indication that to go over the unwritten limit of 1% of gross national produce for defense spending would cause political trouble for the government. It is highly

unlikely that Japan will make any dramatic increases in its share of the United States-Japan defense relationship budget. For this domestic reason, Japan would resist the pressure to go above 1% of gross national product some Americans advocate applying.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY

JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

In the military sense, Japan will not contribute any appreciable amount to East Asian regional security. However, Japan can make other contributions to maintain the present balance in Asia which "will be difficult to improve on."¹²² Although these other contributions will not add to security such as military aid and military presence, they help to a limited degree.

Probably the most powerful levers Japan has for affecting regional stability are economic trade and a market place for purchase of Asian products. Because Japan is the largest trading partner of every non-communist East Asian nation she can reward or punish those countries who are peacemakers or troublemakers. For most of these countries, a reduction or suspension of Japanese trade would be a serious blow to its economy. For the peaceful, stabilizing countries an increase in Japanese purchases would be a supportive gesture.

Many of the East Asian nations are receiving economic aid. The categories of aid include direct investment, grants, loans, and co-production industries. Japan can not, for reasons to be discussed later, exert any military influence on regional security. Although aid can be used to partially replace that influence. Japan can reinforce peaceful friendly countries with different forms of aid. Should the present favorable Asian international economic situation¹²³ deteriorate, aid would be an excellent tool which Japan could use to help

stabilize the region.

The possibility of Japan exporting arms as a method of contributing to regional security is remote to non-existent. Japan does not export arms now. Considering domestic attitudes regarding arms sales and defense expressed in Japanese newspapers, public opinion polls, opposition party statements, and government statements, any arms sales to other states are out of the question. Arms sales or transfers in East Asia will continue to be from the big three, the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

Transfer of technology is another matter. Japan will transfer technology where it won't transfer arms. In the case of a dry dock sale to the Soviet Union,¹²⁴ a technology transfer occurred that will probably contribute to regional insecurity. In another military-related technology transfer, current examples of arms sales suggest that although Japan is not ready to put its security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union on line for the People's Republic of China,¹²⁵ a low-key supply effort at China's request has been acceptable.¹²⁶

In non-military related technology transfers, Japan can contribute to the modernization of developing East Asian countries. Along the lines of aid, technology can be used to support those peaceful countries of the region through increased agricultural and industrial productivity. This type of "reinforcement" supports Japanese security because these countries are then more favorably disposed toward Japan. Once again, the Japanese contribution to regional security is economic power used to stabilize possible unstable political and security

situations.

The maritime security role is the only situation in which Japan Self-Defense Force units operate away from the Japanese home islands. Japan claims it can defend its merchant shipping 500 miles from its coast and 1000 miles in the important sea-lanes to Taiwan and Saipan.¹²⁷ Current legal restrictions and force capabilities prevent any further regional defense. Given the proper scenario, Japan might be tempted to operate Maritime Self-Defense Force units as far as necessary. For example, given the context of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war where the Soviet Union made threatening gestures toward Japan, Japan would probably act to defend its oil lifeline. Options for response could include sealing the exits from the Sea of Japan to Soviet submarines, joint anti-submarine operations with the United States and other interested nations, and convoy operations for the oil tankers. Although this is not in the pacifist, non-involvement tradition of Japan, the Soviet threat is distinct enough that such action is possible under those circumstances. Under less extreme conditions, as postulated earlier, the Japanese will probably pursue every other method short of the threat or use of force to maintain their oil supplies.

LIMITS TO JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS

As just stated, there are several limits to Japanese contributions to regional security. First, if talking about a Japanese military contribution to security or political stability, the reactions of other East Asian nations are very important. Most Southeast Asian nations still have fears of a militarily strong Japan. Much of this

fear is residual from World War II, and though it's thirty-five years old, it is still a very pervasive fear. The Vietnamese feel that Japan is beefing up its forces "to serve as a tool for the ruling Japanese capitalists to realize their long-term expansionist designs."¹²⁸

Realizing the source, one must take that quote with a grain of salt.

However, on a more realistic level Nathan White feels, and this author agrees, that Australia sees any great nationalist or aggressive foreign policy as a threat from Japan if it is coupled with an expanded military.¹²⁹

That Australian attitude is also characteristic of Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines and Malaysia. Probably of most importance to Japan, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China both feel that "...a militarily weak Japan tied to the United States is far preferable to a well-armed Japan operating as an independent actor in Asian affairs."¹³⁰

This all indicates that any major Japanese 'contribution' to regional security, from a military point of view, would actually be a contribution to regional insecurity and instability.

Along these same lines of fear of Japanese military power is a fear of Japanese "economic aggression." This is especially true in Southeast Asia and Australia, where Japan is the largest individual trading partner of every non-communist country. This author's friends in Australia have conveyed the general resentment, and even fear, of the overpowering influence Japan has on their economy. Raul Manglapus, former Foreign Minister of the Philippines, presents a very clear description of how Japan is perceived to be dominating Southeast Asia,

not only economically, but socially and culturally as well.¹³¹ This extended Japanese influence cannot help but lead toward a rise in nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment among the populations of these countries. Such a development will not be good for either Japan or the other countries involved. Japan is dependent on them for the raw materials that sustain her industries and because of their strategic position astride Japan's oil lifeline. The Southeast Asians are dependent on Japan to keep their economies alive. Without Japanese investments, factories, and aid, most of those countries would economically wither away. This leaves a classic dichotomy. Japan cannot do too much without causing trouble for herself, yet if she doesn't do enough there will be trouble also. One possible solution lies in changing the forms of economic ties. Instead of being so highly visible and overbearing, Japanese firms could operate through local companies, hire more managerial-level personnel from the local population, and contribute forms of aid that are not tied to projects that benefit Japanese businesses as much as they benefit the local population.

When considering limits on Japanese contributions toward regional security, probably the most important are Japan's self-imposed limits. Article IX of Japan's constitution is highly regarded at all levels of Japanese society. This article is the foundation of Japan's "peace constitution" and the rallying point for the many pacifist groups through the past thirty years. The 1% of gross national product limit on defense spending, limits on the employment of the Self-Defense Forces, and a reliance on diplomacy and economics to achieve objectives in foreign relations all seem to be deep-seated feelings of the

majority of the Japanese people. Article IX is the symbol of these limits.

After World War II there was a deep revulsion toward war in Japan. The one great lesson of the war for Japan was that economic gains can not be made by waging war. The Japanese people have grown extremely proud and fond of Article IX which does not permit the nation to maintain any war potential, an Army, Navy or Air Force.¹³² It also states that Japan does not recognize the right of belligerency of the state.¹³³

It is within these parameters that the Japan Self-Defense Forces operate. Without an extreme external threat it is highly unlikely that any Japanese government would face the political consequences of violating these deep-seated feelings of the vast majority by sending any military assistance elsewhere in East Asia to maintain regional security. Such an extreme external threat that could prompt Japan to send military forces outside its territory might be attacks on the oil lifeline or a Korean war where the North appeared to be overwhelming the South. Other than those two situations, it is hard to believe that the Japan Self-Defense Forces will participate in any regional security role in the foreseeable future.

JAPAN AND BILATERAL SECURITY

When discussing Japan's perceived threats in the last chapter, the Soviet Union was noted as the country most feared by Japan. Defining regional security as maintenance of the status quo, or "balance of power", it is apparent that as long as tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union do not increase, Japanese security will not suffer. A

relaxation of tensions would enhance security. And, conversely, an increase in tension would cause security and the status quo to become more fragile. Any heightened Soviet threat perceived by Japan, be it submarine, the Northern Territories issue, or even an invasion threat, could trigger increased tensions. It is apparent that Japan and the Soviet Union are not anywhere near cooperating to maintain regional security.

Japanese views of the Soviet Union on a regional level closely parallel the bilateral views. In general, the less Soviet involvement in East Asian affairs, the better off regional stability will be. This is particularly true in the Korean situation. Also, it is to Japan's advantage, in a security context, for the Soviets and the Chinese to remain antagonistic without armed conflict. As long as the two major communist nations are involved with each other, they are not concentrating their combined power on Japan or any other East Asian nation.

Japan is more likely to work outside the home islands to maintain regional security in Korea than elsewhere. Historically, Korea has been defined as the "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." For this reason, Japan has always had a very keen interest in the Korean peninsula. Following the announcement of United States troop withdrawals from Korea in 1977 there was a ministerial conference in Tokyo between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The joint communique issued after the talks said both sides "recognized the necessity of their closer cooperation in international efforts and good-neighborly, friendly and cooperative relations between them to contribute greatly to the peace and stability of the region."¹³⁴ This is significant

because Japan has said that it has a role to play in regional security, in spite of all the limits to Japanese participation discussed earlier. It should be remembered that Korea was one of the two areas where Japan might feel compelled to assist, outside her own borders, in maintaining regional security. If Japan were to cooperate in any kind of bilateral regional security arrangement with a country other than the United States, it would probably be South Korea.¹³⁵ However, the probability of such an arrangement is rather small. There are too many overriding domestic constraints, and no dominating threat to overcome them.

A third area of concern is Japan's relationship with the Southeast Asian nations. Any type of Japanese military contribution to regional security in this area would probably be counter-productive. There is still a strong resentment of the military occupation from 1942 to 1945 and forced integration into the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan is conscious of these feelings and is trying to show its intention not to become involved, militarily, in the region. In October, 1978 the Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines told other Asian nations that Japan was never going to be a military power or pose a threat to any nation.¹³⁶ This was in response to "apprehensions in Asia about Japan's efforts to build up its home defense forces."¹³⁷ It is clear that Japan's domestic constraints are in accord with the fears of the Southeast Asian nations and because of this, Japan will more than likely not have any kind of security relationship in this area in the foreseeable future.

Another area of Japanese regional security concern is the People's Republic of China. In the past eight years there has been a gradually increasing closeness between Japan and China. That relationship took a dramatic jump with the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in the summer of 1978. Trade between the two countries is increasing rapidly. The Chinese are hungry for Japanese technology and the Japanese are hungry for Chinese business and natural resources. Many observers of this situation have said that Japan and China will form an anti-Soviet alliance in the near future. It is this observer's opinion that such an alliance is not probable for several reasons. First is the fear Japan has for the Soviet Union. The Japanese will keep building their ties with China so long as this closeness does not excessively antagonize the Soviets. The second is the still large gap between Japan and China. Those two economies, societies, and political systems are so different that any close alliance is unrealistic.

Although there are those three major differences between China and Japan, they have sufficient common interests to keep them from being adversaries. In addition to needing each other's business, they are both interested in limiting the expanding Soviet influence, or 'hegemony', especially where it concerns their territory. Both countries are also interested in maintaining the regional status-quo, at least the Chinese are for now. They each have their own reasons. Japan for the trade opportunities and China for the time to concentrate on internal development and the Soviet Union. For the foreseeable future Japan and China will continue their economic relationship as long as

Japan does not overly antagonize the Soviets. But, any security relationship to promote regional stability is highly unlikely.

The Japanese relationship with Taiwan has become, for all intents and purposes, entirely economic. Based on observations of Japan's attitudes, Japan would probably do nothing should the People's Republic of China try to take over Taiwan by force. As long as Taiwan remains independent Japan will continue her profitable relationship. The only area of tension between those two parties is the Senkaku Islands, described earlier in some detail. There is almost no possibility of renewed government to government relations, especially in a security context, given the present relationship between Japan and the People's Republic on the mainland.

CHAPTER V security point of view it would

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN EAST ASIA

United States security policy in East Asia has, in several ways, depended on Japan. Through economic power, providing bases for United States forces, and most recently the increasing capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, Japan has been a critical factor in the security equation. The United States continues to state that it is and will continue to be an Asian power.¹³⁸ However, our friends and allies do not appear satisfied with those statements, and with good reason. "The only initiatives we have seen are negative ones," says a Thai Foreign Ministry official. "Do you blame us for wondering if the United States will live up to its treaty obligations?"¹³⁹ Efforts to counter these doubts and fears have included trips by high-ranking officials¹⁴⁰ and increased dialogue, but no active efforts such as force improvements or other evidences of commitment. From the security objectives discussed in Chapter One, it is apparent that the United States needs to maintain a military influence in East Asia. It is also apparent that because of her strategic location, Japan is necessary to the maintenance of that influence. The importance of Japan can be shown in Appendix 6. If the United States were to lose the use of Japanese facilities it would lose about half of its military capability based west of Hawaii. The United States is in a fortunate position. Japan does not want the United States to leave, and in fact, there are indications that Japan wants to be even closer to the United

Both the United

States. As discussed in Chapter Three, Japan is pressing for greater defense cooperation and coordination with the United States. Because of this attitude, "It is probably safe to assume, therefore, that it will not be Japan which is instrumental in changing the United States-Japanese relationship in the direction of weakness."¹⁴¹

Now that the different components of the United States-Japan security relationship have been described, what should the United States do? Where should United States policy be headed? United States security policy in East Asia has three major options. Each can, of course, vary by degree, but is in general within one of the three options.

Dr. Brzezinski has advocated our first option of reducing presence and maintaining emergency deployment and joint use facilities.¹⁴² This is in conflict with the established policy of forward basing of United States forces that has worked well as a deterrent. It also would reduce an already marginal United States capability to respond in the event of a regional crisis. If the United States and Japan were to maintain their combined position under the auspices of the Mutual Security Treaty, this option would necessitate increased Japanese capabilities to 'take up the slack' in defense capabilities. As has been pointed out several times already in this paper, the ability of any Japanese government to radically alter the present Self-Defense Force level is almost non-existent. Therefore, what would probably result is a reduction in the combined United States-Japan defense capability. The only advantage to the United States in this option is that it would help cut the percentage of the United States

defense budget spent in Japan. From a security point of view it would be 'penny-wise and pound-foolish.' The unilateral reduction of defense capabilities has never deterred, what in the end turned out to be, costly wars. And, there is no good reason to believe it would in this case either.

The second option available to the United States is to increase our own force levels to maintain both a credible deterrent and a widely flexible response capability. From a military point of view this option is obviously the most attractive. There are, however, inherent flaws in such a program. The first is that force increases are an "unfriendly" gesture to most people. A major thrust of United States foreign policy is peace and good will. An increase in military presence would undercut that policy position. A second flaw is the result that would occur in East Asia. It would be easy to see an increase in United States presence as an open invitation to start a regional arms race, automatically creating instability and insecurity. Finally and most importantly, such a position is politically impossible here in the United States. First, is the general feeling apparent in the country that non-involvement and reduced force levels is the way we should be headed. And second, is the undesirable expense such a force level increase would entail.

The third and final option for United States security policy in East Asia splits the difference between the first two. It takes some advantages from each in addition to rejecting most of their disadvantages. This option calls for neither reducing nor increasing, but maintaining the current force levels in East Asia. Both the United

States' and Japan's security positions would be improved if this were done in conjunction with increased cooperation and coordination between the two countries' forces. For the United States this would mean repressing the apparent effort to slow down or inhibit the development of this cooperation and coordination. The Japanese have been quietly active in pursuing this goal, and with good reason. Given the present political climate in the United States, any increases in military capability, especially in Asia, are unlikely. Having described the Japanese feelings on security in Chapter Three, it should be apparent that an increased defense capability is desired, but is politically unattainable on the domestic (Japan) level. Japan also sees United States' domestic conditions as being unfavorable to increased capabilities. With these two factors the only way Japan sees to increase defensive capabilities is through increased cooperation and coordination between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces. This should also be apparent to the United States, but for some reason, possibly fear of rapid involvement, this process has been proceeding slowly.

There are several advantages to this option. In addition to the increased capability of combined forces there are some political benefits. Increased Japanese participation would help defuse arguments in the United States about Japan having a "free ride" in defense. By paying a greater share in an integrated logistics and supply system Japan could help redress the current trade imbalance. Increased cooperation would capitalize on the recent trend in Japan, noted in Chapter Three, for maintenance of the Mutual Security Treaty, the United

States relationship, and a greater role in defense without drastic increases. It would give the United States a chance to show that it can cooperate with Japan without appearing, as oftentimes in the past, to "dictate" policy from Washington. And finally, and of great importance to the United States, this increased security level through greater cooperation and coordination can be achieved without any major new expenditures.

The thrust of this paper has been to show how United States security policy in East Asia is affected by Japan. The first requirement was to describe United States security objectives and then the security-related aspects of Japanese-American relations. By describing security from the Japanese point of view in Chapters Three and Four, hopefully a new perspective on East Asian security was illuminated. Then by going back to the United States objectives, and keeping in mind the Japanese perspective, options and proposals for United States security policy in East Asia were presented.

FOOTNOTES

¹These objectives were derived from the author's analysis of the following major policy statements: President Gerald Ford, speech declaring a New Pacific Doctrine, Honolulu, 7 December 1975; Vice-President Walter Mondale, news conference opening statement, Tokyo, 1 February 1977; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speech before the Asia Society, New York, 29 June 1977; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 20 February 1978.

²Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, "The U.S. Posture in Asia and the Pacific: The View From CINCPAC," Strategic Review, Summer 1978, p. 42.

³Raul S. Manglapus, Japan in Southeast Asia: Collision Course (Washington, D.C. and New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976), p. 8.

⁴The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 1978/79," in Air Force Magazine 61 (December 1978), p. 125.

⁵Statement by the Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 20 February 1978.

⁶Weisner, p. 43

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹There are several reasons, other than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, why Japan is not producing nuclear weapons. One is doubt concerning their effective employment in defense of densely populated Japan. Another is wide-spread, emotional anti-nuclear sentiment that is the result of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs of World War II. More reasons are discussed in Chapter Two.

¹⁰Because of recent United States troop withdrawals and diplomatic actions, both of these countries seriously doubt the effectiveness of the United States' "nuclear umbrella" in their defense.

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¹²Yuan-Li Wu, U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the Western Pacific (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975) p. 8.

¹³Ibid.

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- ¹⁶Ibid.
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- ¹⁸Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977, p. 21.
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- ³²JCIE, Handbook on Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 11.
- ³³David P. Lohmann, "Japan's Evolving Defense Policy; Process and Content," paper prepared for the 1978 Conference of the Section on Military Studies, International Studies Association, Charleston, South Carolina, 8-10 November 1978.

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⁵⁹New York Times, 8 October 1974, p. L7.

⁶⁰Pempel, p. 170.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid.

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⁶⁴"JCP Issues Statement on Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines" (Tokyo: Akahata), trans. FBIS, 7 December 1978, p. C3.

⁶⁵Japan, Constitution of Japan, chapter 2, art. 9.

⁶⁶"Government to Bear Increased Share of U.S. Base Expenses" (Tokyo: Kyodo), FBIS, 21 August 1978, p. C3.

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
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
Numerous interviews were conducted with officials in the Department of Defense during the research.

Appendix 1



Note: Figures are estimates by the Defense Agency.
Disregard U.S. Forces in Taiwan.

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977.



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Appendix 3

Comparison of Standard Defense Force & Present Strength

Item			Standard Defense Force	Accomplished Strength at the end of 4th Buildup Plan (Estimate: 1977)
GSDF	Self-Defense official quota		180,000 men	180,000 men
	Basic Units	Units deployed regionally in peacetime	12 Divisions 2 Combined Brigades	12 Divisions 1 Combined Brigade
		Mobile Operation Units	1 Armored Division 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade
		Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups	8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups
MSDF	Basic Units	Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operation) Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Units) Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Land-Based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units	4 Escort Flotillas 10 Divisions 6 Divisions 2 Flotillas 16 Squadrons	4 Escort Flotillas 10 Divisions 6 Divisions 2 Flotillas 17 Squadrons
	Major equipment	Anti-Submarine Surface Ships Submarines Operational Aircraft	Apx. 60 Ships 16 Submarines Apx. 220 Aircraft	61 Ships 14 Submarines Apx. 210 Aircraft
ASDF	Basic Units	Aircraft Control and Warning Units Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Early Warning Units High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	28 Groups 10 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 6 Groups	28 Groups 10 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 3 Squadrons 5 Groups, and 1 more being planned
	Major equipment	Operational Aircraft	Apx. 430 Aircraft	Apx. 490 Aircraft

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977.THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
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Appendix 4

Inventory Figures

(As of Mar. 31, 1977)

Item	Approx. figures
Rifle, etc.	240,000
Machinegun, etc.	6,700
Recoilless rifles	1,100
Mortar	1,900
Field gun	900
Anti-aircraft gun	170
Tank	770
Self-propelled artillery	460
Armored personnel carrier	670

Specifications (Part 1)

Item	Caliber (mm)	Length (m)	Weight (kg)	Loading formula	Maximum rate of fire (r/min.)	Maximum range (meters)
Type-64 7.62mm rifle	7.62	0.99	4.3	Magazine	450	3,700
Type-62 7.62mm machinegun	7.62	1.2	10.7	Link	650	3,700
Type-60 106mm recoilless gun	106	3.41	215	Manual/single	7	7,700
Type-64 81mm mortar	81	1.29	52	Manual/single	30	3,550
Type-58 155mm howitzer	155	7.2	5,700	Manual/single	16/10 min.	15,000
Twin-barrel 35mm anti-aircraft automatic cannon	35	7.9	6,800	Electric	550/min. x 2	—

Specifications (Part 2)

Item	Total length (m)	Total width (m)	Total height (m)	Total weight (tons)	Maximum speed (km/h)	Crew (men)	Main firearms
Type-74 tank	9.41	3.2	2.3	38	53	4	105mm tank gun
Type-75 155mm self-propelled howitzer	7.8	3.0	2.5	25.3	47	6	155mm howitzer
Type-73 armored personnel carrier	5.8	2.9	2.0	13.3	60	12	12.7mm heavy machinegun

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977.THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY FRAGMENTS
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Number of Ships in Service

(As of Mar. 31, 1977)

Ship	Number	Tonnage (in 1,000 tons)
Destroyer	44	92
Submarine	15	22
Minelayer, minesweeper	38	15
Patrol ship	30	7
Tank landing ship	5	9
High-speed rescue ship	15	22
Support ship	334	27
Total	481	194

Specifications

Ship	Type	Standard displacement (tons)	Speed (knots)	Main equipment
Destroyer	Haruna type	4,700	32	2 5-inch guns 2 triple torpedo tubes 1 Asroc launcher 3 anti-sub helicopters
	Tachikaze type	3,850	32	2 5-inch guns 1 guided missile launcher 1 Asroc launcher 2 triple torpedo tubes
	Chikugo type	1,470	25	1 twin 3-inch gun mount 1 twin 40mm automatic cannon mount 1 Asroc launcher 2 triple torpedo tubes
Submarine	Uzushio type	1,850	20	6 torpedo tubes
Mine-sweeper	Takami type	380	14	1 20mm automatic cannon 1 minesweeping system
Tank landing ship	Miura type	2,000	14	1 twin 3-inch gun mount 1 40mm automatic cannon

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Branch	Type	Model	Purpose	Number	Maximum speed (knots)	Crew	Total length (m)	Total width (m)	Engine (type, output)	Acquisition formula
GSDF	Fixed wing	LR-1	Liaison, reconnaissance	7	272	2 (5)	10	12	Turboprop 665 hp x 2	Japan-made
	Helicopter	OH-6J	Liaison, observation	101	130	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft 270hp x 1	Japan-made under license
		HU-1B/H	Utility	126	120	2 (11)	12	3	Ditto 1,400hp x 1	Ditto
		V-107	Transport	50	140	3 (25)	25	5	Ditto 1,400hp x 2	Ditto
MSDF	Fixed wing	P2V-7	Anti-sub, patrol	19	330	12	28	31	Reciprocal 3,750hp x 2 Aux. turbojet 1,550kg x 2	Grant, Japan-made under license
		P-2J	Ditto	70	330	12	29	31	Turboprop 3,060hp x 2 Aux. turbojet 1,400kg x 2	Japan-made
		PS-1	Ditto	17	284	12	34	33	Turboprop 3,060hp x 4	Ditto
		S2F-1	Ditto	35	233	4	13	21	Reciprocal 1,525hp x 2	Grant
		US-1	Rescue	3	270	12	34	33	Turboprop 3,060hp x 4	Japan-made
	Helicopter	HSS-2	Anti-sub	61	144	4	17	5	Turboshaft 1,400hp x 2	Japan-made under license
		V-107	Minesweeping	7	140	4	25	5	Ditto	Ditto
ASDF	Fixed wing	F-4EJ	Combat	92	Mach 2 plus	2	19	12	Turbojet 8,130kg x 2	Japan-made under license
		F-104J	Ditto	174	Mach 2	1	17	7	Ditto 7,170kg x 1	Ditto
		F-86F	Ditto	216	Mach 0.89	1	11	12	Ditto 2,760kg x 1	Japan-made under license, grant
		T-1	Training	57	478	2	12	11	Ditto 1,400kg x 1	Japan-made
		T-2	Ditto	41	Apx. Mach 1.6	2	18	8	Turbofan 3,207kg x 2	Ditto
		T-33	Ditto	185	460	2	12	12	Turbojet 2,090kg x 1	Japan-made under license, grant
		T-34	Ditto	82	155	2	8	10	Reciprocal 225hp x 1	Japan-made under license, import
		C-1	Transport	21	425	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan 6,580kg x 2	Japan-made
		YS-11	Ditto	13	260	5 (40)	26	32	Turboprop 3,025hp x 2	Ditto
	Helicopter	V-107	Rescue	22	140	5	25	5	Turbo-shaft 1,400hp x 2	Japan-made under license

Note: Number is based on the National Asset Ledger as of Mar. 31, 1977.

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Appendix 5

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON THE JAPAN DEFENSE
POLICY AND JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCEPublic Information Section
The Secretariat of the Cabinet
1969, 1972, 1975

Question 1: Judging from the contemporary international situation, do you feel there is any danger of fear that Japan would get involved in a war?

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: Yes, there is the danger	25%	25%	15%
Cannot deny such a possibility	27%	27%	29%
No danger	23%	23%	34%
Don't know	25%	25%	22%

Question 2: What do you think is the best way to prevent possible enemy from invading Japan?

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: Japan should exclusively depend upon diplomacy, had better not have any type of armed forces.	25%	20%
Admitting the dependence on diplomacy, additionally we should have necessary and minimum defense power.	46%	58%
Don't know	29%	22%

Question 3: Which do you think is the best policy for Japan's national security at present and in the near future?

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: To abolish the existing United States-Japan Security Treaty and build up the Japan Self-Defense Force, namely to secure national defense for Japan itself.	13%	11%	9%
As it has been, to secure national defense by both dependence on the Treaty and gradual buildup of Japan Self-Defense Force	41%	41%	54%
To abolish the Treaty, additionally to reduce or do away with Japan Self-Defense Force	10%	16%	9%
Other choice	1%	1%	1%
Don't know	35%	31%	27%

Question 4: How do you behave if Japan should be invaded by any foreign country?

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: To take part in Japan Self-Defense Force and fight with the enemy.	8%	6%
To support Japan Self-Defense Force in any way	32%	32%
To resist in guerrilla warfare	3%	2%
To take a resistance in non-combat way	12%	14%
Don't resist at all	6%	12%
Don't know	37%	33%
Other choice	2%	1%

Question 5: On the Defense budget

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: It should be increased	24%	10%	13%
Maintain as it is	38%	42%	48%
It should be decreased	14%	25%	24%
Don't know	24%	25%	24%

Amount of the Defense Budget (billion \$)	1.6	2.7	4.4
A portion of gross national product (%)	.84	.88	.84
A portion of the whole national Budget (%)	7.18	6.98	6.23

Question 6: Do you support the establishment and existence of Japan Self-Defense Force?

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: Yes	75%	73%	79%
No	10%	12%	8%
Don't know	15%	15%	13%

Question 7: What do you think is the major role of Japan Self-Defense Force?

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Answer: To secure national defense	50%	56%	57%
To maintain internal order	22%	20%	21%
Restoration of disaster (disaster relief)	13%	10%	13%
Civil cooperation	2%	2%	1%
Don't know	13%	12%	8%

Source: Government of Japan, Public Information Section, Cabinet, 1977.

Appendix 6

U. S. FORCES IN EAST ASIAU. S. FORCES OUTSIDE JAPANU. S. FORCES IN JAPANAIR FORCES

about 120 tactical planes

about 170 tactical planes

2 air patrol groups

2 air patrol groups

1 carrier air wing

1 carrier air wing

30 strategic planes

MARITIME

1 carrier task force

1 carrier task force

2 amphibious ready groups

total approx. 8 ships

other 7th Fleet units

approx. half the 7th Fleet

total approx. 40-45 ships

ports of call and the only

major repair facilities west

of Pearl Harbor

GROUND

1 Infantry Division (leaving now)

1 Marine Division

1 Air Defense Artillery Brigade

Support units for Korea

1 missile command

source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1977

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